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PRELIMINARY WARNINGS…
“Men possess thoughts, but symbols possess men”.1 
Contemporary societies covet the notion of a written constitution. Yet should Britain 
choose to draft one, can I offer this important suggestion: please, call it anything but a 
“Constitution”. This statement is only slightly made in jest; in fact, it is quite serious. 
Constitutional fetishism,2 constitutional worship3 or “constitutional idolatry”,4 is nothing 
to take lightly. While there has been a copious amount of commentary on the prospects and 
potential form of a UK written constitution, in addition to its history and evolution, the 
possibility of constitutional idolatry becoming a significant factor throughout the citizenry, 
in the political arena, and especially in constitutional review and adjudication, appears to 
have been left out of the discussion.5 This is unfortunate, because the enactment of a 
codified Constitution will have an impact upon all these aspects in one way or another, and 
the potential development of some form of constitutional worship should be further 
discussed and debated before any action is taken.  
Eighteenth and nineteenth century Britons, as Sedley recognises, would probably not 
have given the same puzzled look when asked about their constitution, considering the 
“belief that a constitution is a document and that we do not have one is a comparatively 
recent phenomenon”.6 Yet signs increasingly point to some type of written constitutional 
document developing in the UK.7 Without one codified document the British constitution 
remains a diverse combination of statutes, common law, customs, manuals, parliamentary 
rules, and other entities. The “flat” nature of law in the UK contributes to a unique and 
dynamic legal system. As Norton writes, “[t]here is no clear or formal dividing line 
between what constitutes a core component of the constitution and what does not”.8 A 
codified Constitution would change this significantly, incorporating into the legal 
landscape a more hierarchical and potentially stagnate structure. Furthermore, and 
importantly to this piece, there’s little question such a document would threaten the notion 
of parliamentary sovereignty,9 and Britain’s distinctively structured and widely recognised 
“political constitution”. 10  In addition to these overarching changes, the effects of 
1 M. Lerner, “Constitution and Court as Symbols” (1937) 46(8) Yale Law Journal 1290, 1293. For this 
quotation Lerner was indebted to Professor Hermann Kantorowicz, University of London. 
2 Lerner, “Constitution and Court as Symbols” (1937) 46(8) Yale Law Journal 1294-1305. 
3 F. I. Schechter, “The Early History of the Tradition of the Constitution” (1915) American Political 
Science Review 9(4), 707-734.  
4 M. Klarman, “A Skeptical View of Constitution Worship”, Constitution Day lecture, Johns Hopkins 
University (16 Sept 2010) at http://balkin.blogspot.tw/2010/09/skeptical-view-of-constitution-
worship.html.  
5 Throughout the article I use “constitutional idolatry”, “constitutional fetishism” and “constitutional 
worship” interchangeably.  
6 S. Sedley, “No Ordinary Law” (1998) 30(11) London Review of Books 20.  
7 A. Blick, “Codifying – or not codifying – the UK constitution: A Literature Review”, House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2011) pp. 17-24. 
8 P. Norton, “Introduction: A Century of Change” in P. Norton (ed) A Century of Constitutional Reform 
(West Sussex: Wiley, 2011), p. 2. 
9 V. Bogdanor and S. Vogenauer, “Enacting a British Constitution: Some Problems” (2008) P.L. 38, 53-57. 
10 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 1-21. 
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constitutional idolatry could arise and become problematic.11 This article focuses on three 
such problems: i) an over willingness to assert the “constitutional” or “unconstitutional” 
labels regarding issues of governance and other societal problems may be developed by 
politicians, the media, and the general public, leading to a devaluation – or 
oversimplification – of constitutional discussion and debate; ii) judges using “constitution” 
as a rhetorical device for expanding judicial power, and also giving undue weight to the 
opinions of the founders or writers of such a document, negating contemporary viewpoints 
(including their own); and iii) a lack of incentive by the people – as opposed to the courts 
– to enact constitutional change.   
While I remain sceptical of many (overly) positive assertions regarding the grandeur of 
such documents, there are certainly valid arguments for enacting written constitutions. 
Delineating the structure of the state and operations of governance, entrenching widely 
held fundamental values and rights, and expressing the form and content of state power are 
among some of the major reasons for enacting a constitution. The Human Rights Act 1998 
and devolution legislation, in addition to other significant documents (acts, codes, manuals, 
etc.), have already provided the UK with a sense of what a formal Constitution may entail. 
Further, without such a codified document the UK is potentially exposed to constitutional 
tumult, based on the whims of the electorate and the strength of parliamentary majorities. 
Indeed, the incoming Conservative government has proposed changing major aspects of 
the UK constitution, such as scrapping the Human Rights Act 1998 and potentially exiting 
the European Union. Nevertheless, even with a parliamentary majority these changes will 
be extremely difficult to accomplish, and both – at the time of publication – remain intact.  
Although it is acknowledged that enacting any type of foundational document, whatever 
called, encompasses particular implications, this piece contends that attaching the word 
“constitution” to a foundational document enhances such consequences, leading to a more 
distinctive “constitutional” fetishism. Difficulties arise because over centuries the word 
“constitution” has evolved from a largely structure-based meaning into a widely expansive 
symbolic meaning. Beyond merely delineating the structure of a state, the word now carries 
a variety of connotations. Some see it as the ultimate illustration of “we the people” popular 
sovereignty or as a vindication of the rule of law, while others see it as the completion or 
ultimate formation of a state or a government.12 Indeed contemporary constitutions, and 
especially Constitutions, serve highly symbolic functions that can manifest into significant 
issues for law, politics and the wider democratic state. Nowadays the word “constitution” 
is often used as a legal, political, and psychological truncheon: it has been employed to 
have ordinary documents masquerade as constitutions, been brazenly used to hollow out 
jurisdiction, and also been applied to have legislators think in legal, as opposed to political, 
terms.13 Given some of the rhetoric in the UK surrounding the possibility of a written 
                                                 
11 However the effects of constitutional idolatry do not have to be negative; some may well have a positive 
impact. 
12 Thomas Paine famously wrote that a constitution “is a thing antecedent to a government” (M. Loughlin, 
The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), p. 46).  
13 Regarding the latter point, Tushnet believes this happens because of “judicial overhang”: when 
lawmakers and others become apathetic to constitutional matters arising in the parliamentary process, 
believing the judiciary will remedy any such mistakes (M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the 
Courts (Princeton: PUP, 1999) pp. 57-65; M. Tushnet, Weak Courts: Strong Rights (Princeton: PUP, 2009) 
pp. 81-82).  
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constitution coming into being (i.e., “A New Magna Carta”, “Constitution Carnival”, 
“Commission for Democracy”),14 problems of “constitutional” fetishism could become 
substantially more relevant if a founding British document is enacted. 
Presently constitutions are “more widely accepted than at any other point in modern 
political history”,15 but not all jurisdictions have a written “Constitution” per se. Some, 
such as Hong Kong and Germany, have “Basic Law”.16 Others, such as Hungary and 
Vatican City, have “Fundamental Law”. In some jurisdictions higher law is known as a 
collection of “Organic Law”;17 while in others a “National Charter” or “Covenant” is 
recognised.18 Of course, in some states primary statutory law can be “constitutional” (e.g., 
Britain, New Zealand). But those terms are not the only options, and nor have they been 
previously.19  
The UK may have a particular historical interest in not labelling any written document 
a “Constitution”, especially considering how preceding constitutional and quasi-
constitutional documents have been titled. Britain’s, and often thought of as democracy’s, 
first constitutional document was known as the Magna Carta (“Great Charter” or “Big 
Charter”). The document “is widely thought of as a precursor to modern declarations of 
independence and constitutions”.20 But other documents have been uniquely named. The 
only official written constitution Britain ever had, however briefly, was named the 
“Instrument of Government”;21  implemented by Oliver Cromwell in 1653. 22  Between 
1649-1660 several attempts were made to devise a written constitution, but none were 
called a “constitution”; the documents used “terms such as covenant, instrument, 
agreement, model, paramount or fundamental law”.23 Next came the modern-sounding Bill 
of Rights 1689, which further restricted the king’s powers while enhancing parliament’s. 
The Act of Settlement 1701 followed, which though a “considerable achievement” that 
went some way to ensuring judicial independence, may have had more symbolic than 
substantive effects. 24 The Acts and Treaty of Union between Scotland and England (1707) 
also had constitution-like effects, including expressed fundamental values; but while they 
                                                 
14 Citations in order of examples: Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna 
Carta (10 July 2014) HC 463; LSE Professor Conor Gearty’s “Crowdsourcing the UK’s Constitution” 
project at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/constitutionuk/; Blackburn, “Enacting a Written Constitution for the United 
Kingdom” 36(1) Statute Law Review 1, 21.  
15 M. Loughlin, “The Constitutional Imagination” (2015) 78(1) M.L.R. 1, 2. 
16 Macau, Israel, and Saudi Arabia also use Basic Law.  
17 France’s organic laws contain more power than statutes but do not have “constitutional” status. Spain and 
Taiwan have similar organic laws.  
18 See, e.g., the Palestinian National Authority.   
19 Although I attempt to use examples below from jurisdictions that employ alternative constitutional 
labels, it should be noted that an empirical examination of such phenomena, which would certainly be 
interesting, is outwith the scope of this article. 
20 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008) p. 1. 
21 M. Loughlin, The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2013), p. 49.  
22 There is dispute over this. Gordon notes the UK has had two written Constitutions, the second being the 
“Humble Petition and Advice”, written in 1857 to replace the Instrument of Government (Gordon, 
Repairing British Politics (2010), p. 15, n. 33). However, Gordon does not elaborate on this, and I have 
found no other text that claims the Humble Petition and Advice as an “official” written Constitution.  
23 G. Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) American Political Science Review 
56(4), 853, 860.  
24 Alison, English Historical Constitution (2007), pp. 81-83.  
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were “[c]leary of momentous impact”,25 throughout the years they have not been treated as 
an entrenched “constitution” by governmental organs.26  
More recent proposals have also refrained from using “constitution”. Tony Benn called 
his 1991 proposal the “Commonwealth of Britain Bill”.27 The most modern manifestation 
of a quasi-constitutional document came in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998. That 
same year Scotland gained what has been widely regarded as its own partial “written 
constitution”, but which is known simply as the Scotland Act 1998. Interestingly, at the 
turn of the century some statutory law began to be overtly labelled “constitutional” in 
nature: both the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010 provided significant changes to Britain’s governmental structure. 
Nevertheless, finding a way around a written “Constitution” has been, and remains, in the 
UK’s best interests.  
This article is divided into four primary sections. The first explores how the word 
“constitution” has changed meanings over time. Once used primarily to refer to a country’s 
form or arrangement of government,28  the word now carries a tremendous amount of 
weight. It also discusses how the legal, political and psychological effects of a written 
“Constitution” go beyond being firmly entrenched positive law. The following section 
explains why a written document with “constitution” on its face may have implications for 
the judiciary, including: placing increased constitutional review in the hands of judges and 
also allowing the document to be seen as the ultimate interpretative device. Next, 
constitutions can sometimes turn into stagnate entities (e.g., the US Constitution is a prime 
example).29 Scholars contend this occurs because of constitutional amendment rules or 
divided politics, but I argue a significant cognitive element is also involved. Although 
Weiler30 demonstrates how the word “constitution” can be used as an enabling device to 
gather public interest and increase discussion in particular situations, the converse can also 
be true: the majesty attached to “Constitutions” can sometimes provide citizens a 
disincentive to change such documents. The considerable amount of constitutional change 
the UK experienced over the past couple decades would not have been possible with a 
written constitution, especially not an enduring document seen as a prominent national 
symbol. Finally, constitutional reform discussion often only discusses levels of 
“constitutional” documents while neglecting more sensible options, such as incremental 
organic laws.  
Throughout the article I often use examples from America to demonstrate the power of 
constitutional idolatry. This is done not because the UK and US are on similar 
                                                 
25 C. M. G. Himsworth and C. M. O’Neill, Scotland’s Constitution: Law and Practice (2nd ed)(West 
Sussex: Bloomsbury Professional, 2009), p. 39.  
26 Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution (2006), pp. 51-52. Although Himsworth and O’Neill raise the 
argument the treaty should be treated as a written constitution, they also note the many “formidable 
counter-arguments” against such a notion. (Himsworth and O’Neill, Scotland’s Constitution (2009), p. 40) 
27 Commonwealth of Britain Bill (HMSO: London, 1991).  
28 Lutz, “From Covenant to Constitution in American Political Thought” (1980) 10(4) Publius 101, 105.  
29 See B. Ackerman, “The Living Constitution” (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1737, 1741 (“a funny 
thing happened to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We have lost our ability to write down 
our new constitutional commitments in the old-fashioned way. This is no small problem for a country that 
imagines itself living under a written Constitution”.) 
30 J. H. H. Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 181. 
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constitutional trajectories or because they share a common predilection for unifying 
political symbols, but because the birth of modern constitutionalism arose in late 18th 
century America, and its worldwide impact has been profound. Additionally, for over two 
centuries and more America’s Constitution has sown deep roots throughout many facets of 
contemporary society, and constitutional idolatry has in many ways become a civil, secular 
religion. Examining the effects of such a unique phenomenon of constitutional fetishism 
could aid the UK, and especially those advocating a modern symbolic constitution, when 
discussing the ramifications of a codified document.  
 
The weighty nature of “constitution” 
In its modern form the term “constitution” remains relatively young.31 Seventeenth and 
sometimes eighteenth century uses of the word do associate it with law and statues, among 
other things, but it was “not used to refer to a specific document”.32 Lord Bolingbroke 
noted in 1735 that “[b]y Constitution, we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and 
exactness, that assemblage of laws, institutions, and customs, derived from certain fixed 
principles of reason … that compose the general system, according to which the 
community hath agreed to be governed”.33 Historically, it has meant the form in which a 
state is organised, and “especially as to the location of sovereign power”.34 Even Aristotle, 
often said to be the first constitutional comparativist, used the word politeia, which does 
not mean “constitution”, but “the way in which a polity is patterned”.35 In contemporary 
discussion within Britain over a written constitution many commentators appear to desire 
not a politeia but a modern-day “constitution”, which, as Pryor notes, are often “reified as 
much for their rhetoric, ‘original’ appearance and supposed uniqueness as for their 
constitutive effects”.36 
This article primarily discusses the word “constitution” from a legal and political 
perspective. However separating the legal and political functions of the word from its more 
personal (individual) connotations is also extremely difficult, if not impossible. Sometimes 
commentators, including judges and other legal actors, talk as if the legal, political, and 
personal meanings are one in the same, or inherently intertwined through a national text. I 
believe this overlap is dangerous, and can be especially so in regard to interpreting such 
texts. Yet the phenomenon of combining (or perhaps confusing) these multiple meanings 
is also not surprising, considering: 
 
Our national constitutions are perceived by us as doing more than simply 
structuring the respective powers of government and the relationships between 
public authority and individuals or between the state and other agents. Our 
                                                 
31 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) American Political Science Review 56(4), 
853, 859. 
32 Lutz, “From Covenant to Constitution in American Political Thought” (1980) 10(4) Publius 101, 114. 
33 Viscount Bolingbroke, On Parties (1735) 108 as quoted in D. S. Lutz, “From Covenant to Constitution in 
American Political Thought” (1980) 10(4) Publius 101, 114. 
34 Lutz, “From Covenant to Constitution in American Political Thought” (1980) 10(4) Publius 101, 113.  
35 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56(4) American Political Science Review 
853, 860.  
36 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008), p. 165.  
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constitutions are said to encapsulate fundamental values of the polity and this, 
in turn, is said to be a reflection of our collective identity as a people, as a nation, 
as a state, as a community or as a union”.37 
 
The modern conception of a “constitution” has largely been attributed to the American 
Constitution of 1787,38 which included a Bill of Rights and began with the words “We the 
People”, and also the 1789 French Declaration of Rights.39 Both formed in the midst of 
violent revolutions, from this point forward the idea of a “constitution” radically changed 
how people think about the word, its meanings, and the power of subsequent documents.40 
Constitutions no longer merely encapsulated the “entire body of laws, institutions, and 
customs that comprised” a state, but the idea of “the people constituting a state”.41 It then 
followed that some form of written document, “in visible form”, 42 would be produced and 
displayed. It was this incorporation of “the people” into modern constitutions that critically 
changed the fundamental meaning of the word, and these notions of popular sovereignty 
have endured.43 For many, including those in America, the Constitution is considered a 
form of civil religion, or scripture.44 Although valid questions remain as to the rhetoric 
versus reality of the US Constitution,45 the document remains held in exceptionally high 
esteem, as does the Supreme Court, the supposed “guardians of the Constitution”. Despite 
the fifteen constitutions in France since their 18th century revolution,46 the Declaration of 
Rights (1789) and the notion of popular sovereignty have also endured, and aspects of the 
former have even been incorporated into the most recent 1958 constitution.47 
One of the major differences between historical and modern constitutions is that modern 
“[c]onstitutional texts are performative: they perform an action, rather than only describe 
an event or make a statement”.48 In describing the essence of such documents, Pryor states:  
 
                                                 
37 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173, 184. 
38 Loughlin, “The Constitutional Imagination” (2015) 78(1) M.L.R. 1, 2, 16.  
39 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56(4) American Political Science Review 
853, 860. 
40 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (2004), p. 46, 120.  
41 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (2004), pp. 120-121. Emphasis is mine.  
42 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (2004), p. 120, quoting Thomas Paine, (Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, 
Common Sense and Other Political Writings, Mark Philp ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p. 122.  
43 However under some regimes (e.g., People’s Republic of China, North Korea) constitutions can be 
merely statements, or purely ornamental.  
44 H. P. Monaghan, “Our Perfect Constitution” (1981) 56(2-3) New York University Law Review 353-396; 
T. C. Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37(1) Stanford Law Review 1-25. 
45 D. Oliver, “Written Constitutions: Principles and Problems” (1992) 45(2) Parliamentary Affairs 135, 
139. Oliver takes issue with the US Constitution’s “we the people” rhetoric.  
46 R. L. Maddox, Constitutions of the World (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 84.  
47 French const., preamble (“The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man 
and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and 
complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and to the rights and duties as defined in the 
Charter for the Environment of 2004”.) 
48 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008) p. 5. 
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“These written texts, like all writing, are therefore much more than aides-mémoire. 
They actively constitute and shape the laws, the history and the subjectivity of a 
nation. … 
These texts in turn help constitute a new body politic and establish a new 
narrative of origin – or history – for that nation”.49 
 
The notion of performative constitutional texts stems from the fact that modern 
constitutions establish a hierarchy of laws, often policed by the judiciary.50 Therefore the 
subsequent laws and history of a nation are to a significant extent shaped by that original, 
fundamental document. Loughlin has recently touched on the performative nature of such 
texts, acknowledging “the manner in which constitutions can harness the power of narrative, 
symbol, ritual and myth to project an account of political existence in ways that shape – 
and re-shape – political reality”.51  
Given this modern change in meaning, it is unsurprising that the word also contains 
considerable symbolic value. When listing the arguments for a written constitution, the 
Commons Constitutional Reform Committee report notes that “[i]t would become a 
symbol and expression of national identity today and a source of national pride”.52 There 
is little doubt this would be the case; after all, the report is brazenly entitled: “A New Magna 
Carta?”.53 But that has not been the only disconcerting rhetoric. Constitution UK (Prof 
Conor Gearty’s organization) recently teamed up with the organisation Unlock Democracy, 
for an event entitled “Unlock Magna Carta”.54 Additionally, Robert Blackburn labelled his 
proposed constitutional commission the “Commission for Democracy”.55 Thus it appears 
the mere possibility of a “constitution” has encouraged a curious salivation for democracy, 
as if it had not already been realised. Outwith such bombast, questions remain as to whether 
Britain needs a written text to be such a visible and recognisable symbol, and if so, how 
powerful a symbol that text would be. The word “constitution” certainly elevates the status 
of legal or political arguments, and at times has an “enormous” impact when used.56 Joseph 
Weiler aptly noted the power of the term when writing on the inappropriateness with which 
it was used to name the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.57 He wrote, “the 
treaty had to masquerade as a constitution in order to achieve the sought-after result”,58 
further stating that “the mere name of the document, rather than its content, has resulted in 
                                                 
49 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008) p. 23. 
50 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (2004), p. 121.  
51 Loughlin, “The Constitutional Imagination” (2015) 78(1) M.L.R. 1, 3. 
52 Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014) HC 463, 
p. 19.  
53 Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014) HC 463. 
54 This event took place in London on 25 March 2015.  
55 Blackburn, “Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom” (2015) 36(1) Statute Law Review 
1, 21.  
56 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173.  
57 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173-174. 
58 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173, 177. 
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a level of public debate and public discourse, notably referenda, which defines the process 
as never before in the course of European integration”.59  
Should Britain decide to use the word on the face of a written document, such legal and 
extra-legal effects should not be easily dismissed, given that the power of language on legal 
and political processes is innate, and profound.60 As Lerner noted in the early 20th century, 
humanity has “always used symbols in the struggle for power, but only latterly have we 
grown aware generally of their importance”. 61  The word “constitution” carries a 
tremendous amount of force; from a legal and political perspective it is often difficult to 
speak in more consequential terms. Writing in 1960 Sartori noted the following:  
 
“Legal terminology…shares the same destiny as political terminology in general: 
that is, it tends to be abused and corrupted. And this is all the more the case in a 
time in which politicians have become ever more conscious of the ‘power of words’.  
In our minds, constitution is a ‘good word.’ It has favorable emotive properties, 
like freedom, justice or democracy. Therefore, the word is retained, or adopted, 
even when the association between the utterance ‘constitution’ and the behavioural 
response that it elicits (e.g., ‘The constitution must be praised, for it protects my 
liberties’) becomes entirely baseless. More precisely, the political exploitation and 
manipulation of language takes advantage of the fact that the emotive properties of 
a word survive—at times for a surprisingly long time—despite the fact that what 
the word denotes, i.e., the ‘thing,’ comes to be a completely different thing”.62 
 
Such language effects would only be heightened under a written “Constitution”, as a 
hierarchical structure of law is implemented and “constitutional” arguments and problems 
take precedence over other legal and political matters. The United States is especially 
attuned to this type of language in regard to their enduring Constitution.  
In 1937 Max Lerner, editor of The Nation, wrote that “[e]very tribe needs its totem and 
its fetish, and the Constitution is ours”.63 Indeed, the US Constitution has so successfully 
become a symbol of national pride and is worshipped so widely among citizens that it is 
now often used as a political weapon. Even slightly questioning its provisions is sometimes 
akin to political heresy.64 One of the most visceral examples of constitutional fetishism can 
                                                 
59 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173, 181. 
60 See generally, D. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Eugene, OR: Resource Publications, 2004); J. 
M. Conley and W. M. O’Barr, Just Words: Law, Language and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998); M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1985); S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (New York, NY: Palgrave, 1974). I have previously noted the 
power of language in the legislative/statutory context (B. C. Jones, “Manipulating Public Law Favorability: 
Is It Really This Easy?” (2013) 2 British Journal of American Legal Studies 511-531; B. C. Jones, 
“Westminster’s Impending Short Title Quandary” (2013) P.L. 223-232; B. C. Jones, “Do Short Bill Titles 
Matter? Surprising Insights from Westminster and Holyrood” (2012) 65 Parliamentary Affairs 448-462). 
61 Lerner, “Constitution and Court as Symbols” (1937) 46 (8) Yale Law Journal 1292. 
62 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56 American Political Science Review 
853, 855.  
63 Lerner, “Constitution and Court as Symbols” (1937) 46(8) Yale Law Journal 1294. 
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be found in the relatively recently formed United States “Tea Party”. This political faction 
prides themselves on being the bearers of “constitutional” values, branding opposition to 
their ideals as constitutional violations. They have even gone so far as to encourage 
members to carry the document with them at all times.65 For all intents and purposes the 
Republican Party has, sometimes begrudgingly and other times not, adopted the Tea Party, 
in addition to much of the group’s constitutional rhetoric. Elected Tea Party politicians 
caucus with Republicans, and the latter now often claim their party is the bearer of 
constitutional government. In a prominent example regarding “constitutional” acts of 
desperation, House Republicans decided to sue President Obama for overstepping his 
constitutional powers because he was executing a law that had been passed by Congress 
and subsequently challenged and ultimately deemed valid by the Supreme Court.66 This 
particular legal action by House Republicans was widely acknowledged as political theatre, 
and was even akin to “impeachment light” by some media outlets, considering at the time 
there was nonsensical talk of full-scale impeachment of President Obama. Further, other 
valid and important constitutional arguments Republications had against the President at 
the time (e.g., the collection of citizen metadata, the use of drones, etc.) got suppressed 
because of such baseless “constitutional” rhetoric. Yet the political bantering about as 
regards “constitutional values” and “constitutional protectors” is preposterous: both 
Democrats and Republicans have major constitutional difficulties at times, and neither can 
claim ultimate “constitutional guardian” status. The unfortunate irony, however, is that the 
document which transformed the modern organisation and governance of democratic states 
to be situated around “we the people”, is now conveniently used as a hollow political 
truncheon.  
But the Tea Party is merely the latest example of such “constitutional” infatuation; 
America’s Constitution has been worshipped since its enactment. Grey writes “[j]ust as 
Christians and Jews take the word of God as sovereign and the Bible as the word of God, 
so Americans take the will of the people as sovereign, at least in secular matters, and the 
Constitution as the most authoritative legal expression of that popular will…it has been, 
virtually from the moment of ratification, a sacred symbol, the most potent emblem (along 
with the flag) of the nation itself”.67 While America may not have a national church, “the 
worship of the Constitution would serve the unifying function of a national civil religion”.68 
The notion that constitutions are a sacred, almost religious document (i.e., a “covenant”) 
contains some linguistic foundations. Pryor writes that such a phenomenon may be 
inevitable, given that “[a] religious idiom therefore persists, despite the sometimes 
deliberately secular tone of modern constitutional texts”.69 
Presently UK constitutional values are not worshipped by the citizenry, not overtly 
used as political weapons, and certainly not used as legal tactics against ministers or others. 
Political parties have platforms and may value certain issues above others, but the 
accusation of unconstitutional proposals, bills, or laws is not lightly and casually brought 
                                                 
65 Economist, The perils of constitution-worship (23 Sept 2010), at 
http://www.economist.com/node/17103701.  
66 J. W. Peters, “House Votes to Sue Obama for Overstepping Powers” New York Times (30 July 2014), 
A15, at { HYPERLINK "http://nyti.ms/1ocvpYu" }.  
67 Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 1, 3. 
68 Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 1, 18. 
69 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008) p. 5. 
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about. Should the UK adopt a written constitution, such circumstances could easily change. 
Individuals or groups may start claiming to be guardians or protectors of such a document, 
and “constitutional” could be used as a proxy for “right or wrong” moral, political, and 
legal values. Therefore use of the word on any document needs to be thoroughly considered, 
given the discrepancies between its historical and modern meanings. As Sartori writes, 
 
“Yet we now refrain from saying ‘this is what the term constitution ought to mean,’ 
even though we are well aware of the fact that ‘constitution’ no longer bears a 
common acceptance and even though we are in a good position to realize that a 
situation of ambiguity and confusion is being deliberately fostered by political 
double-talk and insincerity, with the precise purpose of deceiving the audience …  
I am not advocating, therefore, the preferability of one type of constitutional telos 
in relation to another. I am simply saying that it is a scientific requirement to discuss 
whether it is proper to use ‘constitution’ where, in order that the public (and even, 




At some level judicial implications would result if the UK adopted a codified constitution.71 
In part this is because some constitutional claims would become justiciable,72 and a form 
of constitutional legalism would emerge.73 Barber and Tucker have previously written 
about how power would be shifted to the courts.74 I do not hope to revisit their basic 
arguments here, but merely expand on them. Below are two significant factors to keep an 
eye on in regard to “constitutional” fetishism: the expansion of constitutional review and 
the task of constitutional interpretation.  
 
Expansion of judicial constitutional review 
 
American evolution of judicial review provides an interesting example as to how a written 
“Constitution” may affect parliamentary sovereignty. In the early years of the Republic the 
Supreme Court declined to strike down congressional laws. Marbury v Madison75 changed 
this, “justif[ying] judicial review on the ground that the Constitution was written law—a 
legal document”.76 From this point forward the “practice of judicial review has largely 
rested” on this belief. 77  Since judicial review “was not granted by the text of the 
                                                 
70 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56(4) American Political Science Review 
853, 859. Emphasis in original.  
71 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, “Constitutional role of the judiciary 
if there were a codified constitution”, (2013-2014), HC 802.  
72 D. Oliver, “Written Constitutions: Principles and Problems” (1992) 45(2) Parliamentary Affairs 142-146. 
73 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (2004), pp. 47-52.  
74 N. W. Barber, “Against a Written Constitution” (2008) P.L. 13-15; A. Tucker, “Constitutional Writing 
and Constitutional Rights” (2013) P.L. 345-362.  
75 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
76 Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 1, 15 (“Much of the rhetoric 
justifying judicial review invokes the definite and objective character of a written constitution”.)  
77 Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 1, 14. 
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constitution itself”, Marshall relied “on more indirect arguments”.78 Inevitably rhetoric was 
one of these, as Marshall incorporated such lines as: “the Constitution is written”,79 “the 
very foundation of all written Constitutions”, 80  and “in America where written 
Constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence”. 81  These were powerful 
statements in 1803, and given the evolution of the word “constitution” and the splendour 
with which it has come to be used, stand even more powerfully now. Additionally, it is 
worth noting that in Marbury Justice Marshall vociferously repeated (over sixty times) the 
word “Constitution” in defence of judicial review and in lieu of other popular terms at the 
time, such as “fundamental law”, “superior law”, or “paramount law”.82  His decision 
extolling the virtues of the American Constitution is one of the most influential and widely 
cited judicial decisions in history. Such judicial ruptures are not unheard of in modern times. 
In 1995 the Israeli Supreme Court, explicitly relying on Marbury’s logic, decided its Basic 
Law had “supra-legal” constitutional status and abruptly turned the country from “a state 
based on the English model of parliamentary sovereignty” into a “constitutional state”,83 
thus considerably enhancing judicial review.84  It therefore seems that “constitutional” 
desire, even in jurisdictions that use alternative naming, could be inherently difficult to 
suppress. This is especially true if that desire coincides with an increase in judicial 
authority, considering “the precise constitutional jurisdiction and powers of the courts”85 
are hardly easily settled matters under any written constitution.  
The Commons literature review on codifying the constitution noted that most of those 
proposing codified constitutions “appear to envisage constitutional supremacy as 
supplanting Parliament; with judges able to rule acts of Parliament incompatible with the 
constitution and strike them down”. 86  Note the intriguing use of “constitutional” as 
opposed to “judicial” supremacy in that statement, which appears designed to mitigate such 
a drastic transition in governance. Should this change happen the UK would have to address 
at length the “central obsession”87 of contemporary constitutional scholarship: the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. 88  This arduous task has led to a divide among scholars and 
practitioners over strong versus weak judicial review, the true constitutional guardians, and 
more consequentially, the proper arrangement and mechanics of government. Perhaps 
potential turf battles in the UK would not be too fierce if a document expressly authorised 
the judiciary, or perhaps the Supreme Court, to perform constitutional review (the US 
                                                 
78 A. Tucker, “Constitutional Writing and Constitutional Rights” (2013) P.L. 352. 
79 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), p. 176.  
80 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), p. 178. 
81 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), p. 178. 
82 These terms are used in the decision, albeit infrequently.  
83 Navot, “Israel” in How Constitutions Change (2013), p. 198.  
84 Y. Rabin and A. Gutfeld, “Marbury v. Madison and Its Impact on Israeli Constitutional Law” (2007) 15 
Univ. of Miami International & Comparative Law Review 303, 318-330.  
85 Blackburn, “Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom” (2015) 36(1) Statute Law Review 
1, 6.  
86 A. Bick, “Codifying – or not codifying – the UK constitution” (2011) House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, p. 4.  
87 E. C. Dawson, “Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on Margin of Statutory Passage” 
(2013) 16 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional  Law 97, 100. 
88 A. M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed)(New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986) 
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Constitution does not do so). However even if this is inserted that does not solve the 
intractable problems associated with the counter-majoritarian difficulty and democratic 
governance.  
Some commentators appear to believe parliamentary sovereignty is incompatible with 
“we the people” popular sovereignty.89  But it is unclear how replacing parliamentary 
sovereignty with an increase in judicial authority resolves the problem. The argument 
seems to be: adding “we the people” constitutionalism (i.e., enacting a Constitution) 
increases popular sovereignty; a fiction that has been decisively and thoroughly 
challenged.90 Indeed, the judicialisation of “we the people” popular sovereignty is an ironic 
and unfortunate occurrence. For all intents and purposes in Westminster, the fully-elected 
Commons controls the legislative agenda (with the backing of the executive, of course). 
The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 set this in place by ending the Lords’ veto of primary 
legislation, based around the belief that the elected government should be the foundational 
element of parliamentary sovereignty.91 While there are still lingering difficulties with the 
Lords, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty does not conflict with popular 
sovereignty;92 if anything, through representative government, it validates it. Further, the 
idea that “we the people” popular sovereignty often entails providing unelected judges the 
power to strike down acts sanctioned by elected representatives remains one of the most 
inconsistent realities of 21st century constitutionalism. Ultimately, in many democracies 
operating under such circumstances, “we the people” can often equate to “we the judiciary”.  
 
The ultimate interpretative device?  
 
Another important question is how a “Constitution” would be interpreted by the judiciary. 
Given how the American Constitution evolved in terms of its cultural adoration, this 
practice remains highly controversial, with the main arguments being “over what [judges] 
should interpret and what interpretative attitudes they should adopt”.93 Unsurprisingly, 
constitutional fetishism is evident in such interpretive exercises. A prominent example is 
currently spearheaded by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. His “originalist/textualist” 
theory has become highly significant in constitutional interpretation throughout America’s 
judiciary and legal scholarship.94 The philosophy is based around the idea that language 
and intent should be strictly construed, and “understood in the contexts of the society that 
adopted it”95 (i.e. constitutional meaning is fixed to when it was adopted). Although this 
approach can certainly be regarded as a form of constitutional fetishism, reasonable 
                                                 
89 Gordon, Repairing British Politics (2010).  
90 See, e.g., E. S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).  
91 C. Ballinger, The House of Lords 1911-2011: A Century of Non-Reform (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p. 3.  
92 See, e.g., M. Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and 
Democracy (Oxford: Hart, 2015), pp. 49 (“parliamentary and popular sovereignty share a common 
democratic basis”). 
93 Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 1. 
94 See, e.g., D. L. Drakeman, “What’s the Point of Originalism” (2014) 37 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 1123-1150.  
95 P. Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding” (1980) 60 Boston University Law 
Review 204, 208. 
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arguments exist for texts to be interpreted with these techniques in mind, as opposed to 
allowing judges to determine the meaning of words based on contemporary understandings. 
A converse approach, “living constitutionalism”, also remains popular among judges and 
scholars: this “stems from recognition that any written legal text and any set of 
constitutional provisions, however introduced, at the end of the day produces different 
normative outcomes when the context in which they are embedded and to which they are 
to be applied significantly changes”.96  
The direct and indirect consequences of originalism—and more widely, the popular 
embrace of such Constitutional fetishism—have proved significant, in part because 
ambiguous constitutional phrases have permitted the justices wide interpretative latitude.97 
The second amendment’s “right to keep and bear arms” provides a good example.98 While 
there is some debate as to whether this applies merely to a “well regulated militia” (or 
should even be applicable at all in the 21st century), in District of Columbia v Heller99 the 
Supreme Court made clear that this phrase allows the citizenry to keep and bear arms, no 
matter if states, counties or cities had previously banned such weapons based on evolving 
standards of public safety regarding firearm regulation. Heller was authored by Justice 
Scalia, and is sometimes regarded as “the triumph” of originalist doctrine.100 Although 
firearm violence in the US has steadily declined in recent years, over 11,000 people still 
die from firearm related homicides each year,101 and mass shootings remain a common 
occurrence. 102  Of course, to attribute firearm violence in America to one specific 
constitutional interpretative theory is unfair, and this much is acknowledged. However 
there is little doubt that the theory and its larger popular embrace has at least indirectly 
contributed to the continuance and promotion of the right to keep and bear arms in 21st 
century America, even at the expense of such evolving societal safety standards.103 Such 
promotion and acceptance largely stems from constitutional worship of an antiquated 
document and its authors. As regards this, Weiler notes the following:  
 
“[T]here is also an exquisite irony in a constitutional ethos that, while appropriately 
suspicious of older notions of organic and ethnic identity, at the very same time 
implicitly celebrates a supposed unique moral identity, wisdom, and, yes, 
                                                 
96 C. Fusaro and D. Oliver, “Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change”, in Oliver and Fusaro, How 
Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study (2011) p. 406. 
97 For an interesting take on this, see J. Rosen, “If Scalia Had His Way” New York Times (8 Jan 2011), 
WK1, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/weekinreview/09rosen.html.  
98 US Const., amend II. 
99 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
100 R. B. Seigel, “Dead Or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism In Heller” (2008) 122 Harvard 
Law Review 191-245; A. Gura, “Heller and the Triumph Of Originalist Judicial Engagement: A Response 
to Judge Harvie Wilkinson” (2008) 56 UCLA Law Review 1127-1170.  
101 M. Planty and J. L. Truman, “Firearm Violence, 1993-2011” (2013) US Bureau of Justice Statistics, at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf.  
102 M. Follman, G. Aronson, D. Pan, “A Guide to Mass Shootings in America” Mother Jones (24 May 
2014) at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map.  
103 L. Greenhouse, “Three Defining Opinions”, New York Times (13 July 2008), at WK4, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13greebox.html; see also D. G. Savage, “Supreme 
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superiority of the authors of the constitution—the people, the constitutional demos, 
whenever it wears the hat of constituent power—and those who interpret it.”104 
 
These powerful historical/originalist arguments also tend to distort the legal, political, and 
personal features of “constitutionalism”, making it appear as if the US constitutional text 
is indeed coupled with the current cultural character or common disposition of the 
American people themselves (or at least what they should strive to achieve). Such problems 
could be mitigated, at least to some extent, with the use of alternative terminology. For 
example, a phrase such as “our Constitution” carries much more weight, symbolically and 
substantively, than the phrase “our Basic Law”. 
Within the UK issues such as guns appear relatively fixed for the time being. 
Entrenching other rights, however, such as the right to marry the person of your choosing, 
could prove invaluable. But other important issues of constitutional significance might be 
less suitable for entrenchment, such as the UK relationship with the European Community, 
the role of the monarchy, etc. Many have noted that the Human Rights Act 1998 provided 
the judiciary with enhanced review powers for statutes.105 However judges still cannot 
strike down primary legislation, but merely provide a statement of incompatibility with the 
HRA. Even though judges could be said to have “human rights” in their best interests, 
incompatibility statements by the judiciary happen infrequently. One wonders whether 
such restraint will hold if the judges now have a “Constitution” to uphold, especially one 
that implements constitutional supremacy and serves as a celebrated national symbol of 
sovereign authority.  
 
Constitutional change 
The Commons report also notes that the current unwritten constitution is “evolutionary and 
flexible in nature, more easily enabling practical problems to be resolved as they arise and 
individual reforms made, than would be the case under an entrenched constitutional 
document”.106 Over the past century, and especially in the past couple decades, the UK has 
undergone a significant amount of constitutional change.107 Implementation of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Island, and establishment 
of constitutional committees in Parliament, in addition to a Supreme Court, demonstrates 
the vitality and dynamic nature of constitutionalism in Britain. Although establishing a 
written document could entrench specific rights or special processes, such a document 
would make future changes inherently more difficult, because it could “thus only be 
                                                 
104 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 186. 
105 R. Bellamy, “Political constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act” (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 86, 87; D. Oliver, “United Kingdom”, in Oliver and Fusaro, How Constitutions Change: 
A Comparative Study (2013) pp. 350-352.  
106 R. Blackburn, “Mapping the Path towards Codifying - or Not Codifying - the UK Constitution” in 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014), HC 463, p. 
24. 
107 P. Norton, “Introduction: A Century of Change” in P. Norton (ed) A Century of Constitutional Reform 
(West Sussex: Wiley, 2011).  
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changed by special procedures”.108 However the UK “constitution has endured … because 
of its capacity for change”.109 Flexibility is one of the most advantageous aspects of the 
current structure, and one of the most frustrating aspects of jurisdictions with written 
constitutions. For example, the US Constitution has been labelled “impossible to 
amend”,110 and the Canadian Constitution is said to be at a “standstill”.111  
Yet some are concerned that the UK constitution is too easily changed, and the processes 
that produce such change have become flawed.112 Indeed, constitutional change in the UK 
does not always occur in optimal fashion. In a 2011 report the Lords Constitution 
Committee noted many flaws with the current system, including a lack of formalised 
processes and insufficient scrutiny.113 The same committee noted similar difficulties in a 
2009 report about fast-track legislation.114 In addition to other problems, these are serious 
concerns that should be addressed, but whether they are serious enough to sacrifice 
flexibility for rigidity has not yet been fully comprehended.  
More should be said about the supposed “impossibility” or difficulty of amending 
constitutions. A relatively significant literature exists on comparative constitutional 
amendment procedures,115 and although much of it does an adequate job of explaining the 
difficulties from a procedural, rule-based perspective, most all of it fails to touch on the 
intrinsic value of Constitutions as an impediment to amendment.116 As the earlier material 
highlights, contemporary societies (some more than others) covet constitutions, often 
viewing them as significant sources of symbolism and national pride. Amending these 
documents could be especially difficult for societies that view them in such magisterial 
terms. Therefore another hurdle to the amendment of constitutions operates at a cognitive 
level, represented in the connection citizens have with the Constitution, as opposed to 
ordinary statutes. Statutes are often attached to the ordinary business of politics and law-
making, while Constitutions are often viscerally connected to their authors or enactors 
(sometimes public demigods), larger national identities, and commonly, supreme or 
                                                 
108 F. F. Ridley, “There is no British constitution: A dangerous case of the emperor’s clothes” (1988) 41(3) 
Parliamentary Affairs 340, 343. 
109 Norton, “Introduction: A Century of Change” in Norton (ed) A Century of Constitutional Reform (2011), 
p. 2. Emphasis is mine. 
110 See E. Posner, “The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible to Amend”, Slate (5 May 2014), at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constitution_
is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html.  
111 T. Kahana, “Canada”, in Oliver and Fusaro (eds), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study 
(2013) p. 39. 
112 Blackburn, “Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom” (2015) 36(1) Statute Law Review 
1, 5; see also Andrew Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (Oxford: Hart, 
2015), p. 4. 
113 Lords Constitution Committee, The Process of Constitutional Change (18 July 2011), HL Paper 177.  
114 Lords Constitution Committee, Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards (7 
July 2009), HL Paper 116.  
115 For a review of the literature, see R. Dixon, “Constitutional amendment rules: a comparative 
perspective” in T. Ginsburg and R. Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011) pp. 96-111.  
116 R. Dixon, “Constitutional amendment rules: a comparative perspective” in Ginsburg and Dixon, 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) p. 107) (“[t]he more the population is attached to or identifies with 
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constitutional courts. Modifying the latter is akin to altering the national identity: past, 
present, and future. Given such looming characteristics, long-standing Constitutions 
serving considerably symbolic functions could be difficult to amend. In this situation 
citizens may pass constitutional authority to the judiciary, preferring incremental 
“amendments” by a constitutional court; thus again bringing about the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. 
Whether states that use non-constitutional labels are more amenable to constitutional 
change is difficult to determine, given that each jurisdiction contains a distinct cultural 
history and holds unique political, legal and general values. Nevertheless, a provisional 
look at such prospects could be valuable for future endeavours. Germany, which uses the 
Basic Law label, regularly amends its constitution. In 2010, sixty years after its adoption, 
there were already 55 amendments.117 Meanwhile as of 2014 Israel had amended its Basic 
Law, established in 1958, a total of 81 times.118 But countries such as France, which 
amended its 1958 Constitution twenty-three times in the first fifty years of its existence,119 
and South Africa, seventeen amendments since 1997, 120  demonstrate that 
“Constitutionalising” constitutions may not always provide barriers to change. 
Nevertheless, the French and South African Constitutions are relatively young (both less 
than 60 years old) compared to the American Constitution (over two and a quarter centuries 
old). Should the French and South African documents survive, it will be interesting to see 
how future generations of each country’s citizens connect with and treat their respective 
Constitutions, given that both are attached to iconic figures (Charles de Gaulle and Nelson 
Mandela, respectively), and coincided with one fundamental shift (the end of apartheid in 
South Africa) and a milder, but not insignificant, shift (an indefinite end to constitutional 
tumult in France). 
The current avant-garde expression is to speak in terms of “constitutional moments”.121 
But constitutional maintenance, which occurs through active constitutional surveillance 
and assessment, is also crucially important. The past two decades have demonstrated that 
the UK performs quite well in this regard: in particular the current select committees 
mentioned above do a respectable job of such assessment and maintenance. Unlike in more 
inflexible jurisdictions, “constitutional moments” in the UK do not need to be made or 
contrived … they evolve organically, as they have done for centuries. A modern 
“Constitution”, or even a lesser constitutional document, could change that.  
 
Potential options 
                                                 
117 D. Grimm, “The Basic Law at 60 – Identity and Change” (2010) 11 German Law Journal 33.  
118 Constitute Project, University of Chicago, Annotated copy of 2014 Israeli Basic Law (emailed to 
author). Major amendments came in sixteen separate years. Also, Israel has added three sections to their 
Basic Law since its adoption in 1958: “Human Dignity and Liberty”; “Freedom of Occupation”; “The 
Government”.  
119 M. A. Rogoff, “Fifty years of constitutional evolution in France: The 2008 amendments and beyond” 
(2011) Jus Politicum, available at http://www.juspoliticum.com/Fifty-years-of-constitutional,391.html. 
120 South African Constitution (1996), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/constitution.htm.  
121 See D. Oliver, “Politics, Law and Constitutional Moments in the UK”, in D. Feldman (ed) Law in 
Politics, Politics in Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013) pp. 239-256.  
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Ultimately, Britain must decide what it wants: a contemporary Constitution that also serves 
as a potent national symbol, a statutory/code outline and explanation of governmental 
processes, or the status quo. The first two options have come to be known as the “big bang” 
and “incremental” approaches, respectively.122 The Commons Constitutional Committee 
investigated three options: 
  
 (1)   Constitutional Code – a document sanctioned by Parliament but without 
statutory authority, setting out the essential existing elements and principles of the 
constitution and workings of government. 
 (2)   Constitutional Consolidation Act – a consolidation of existing laws of a 
constitutional nature in statute, the common law and parliamentary practice, 
together with a codification of essential constitutional conventions. 
 (3)  Written Constitution – a document of basic law by which the United Kingdom 
is governed, including the relationship between the state and its citizens, an 
amendment procedure, and elements of reform.123 
 
The “constitutional code” or “constitutional consolidation act” options, although relatively 
moderate from a legal perspective, appear unduly symbolic, almost resembling the 
European Constitutional Treaty that Weiler so thoroughly lambasted.124 He argued that 
“constitution” was used to make an average treaty more significant, writing that the “final 
ironic twist is that this [the use of ‘Constitution’] elevated legitimacy and de facto 
constitutional status will have been given to an instrument whose form and content hardly 
merit such constitutional resplendence”. 125  Will the same thing happen to a British 
constitution that codifies “lesser” documents or the status quo? Expectations of a symbolic, 
unifying written constitution have already been planted throughout the UK.126 Although 
either may go some way to entrenching governmental operations, and perhaps even a few 
of the unique/customary aspects of British constitutional law, the “code” and 
“consolidation act” proposals will probably not satisfy those coveting such a document, 
even if “constitution” is on its face. Indeed, Barber has already noted “[t]here is little to be 
gained” by codifying the status quo.127 
That being said, similarly-situated jurisdictions that have constitutionalised limited 
reform or the status quo have not encountered many difficulties. New Zealand retains an 
unwritten constitution, but enacted the Constitution Act 1986 in order to “describe what 
                                                 
122 D. Oliver, “Towards a Written Constitution”, in C. Bryant, Towards a new constitutional settlement 
(London: The Smith Institute, 2007), p. 146.  
123 R. Blackburn, “Mapping the Path towards Codifying - or Not Codifying - the UK Constitution” in 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014), HC 463, p. 
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124 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International 
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Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 181.  
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exists rather than being truly constitutive”.128 Weak-form judicial review remains the norm, 
and even though judges can issue statements of incompatibility, these have no legal effect 
on the legislative process.129 In terms of the country’s constitutional evolution, “[t]here is 
a different arena of constitutional development in which proposals for change are not 
explicitly promoted … statutes and values, or practices, simply evolve to have certain 
importance and sanctity that earns the label ‘constitutional’”.130 Additionally, Australia has 
a century-old Constitution that lacks a bill of rights, but excessive constitutional worship 
does not appear to have taken hold, and the courts on the whole appear more deferential to 
parliament.  
If the UK decides to draft a written “Constitution” it should first provide a temporary 
text that could eventually become a formal constitution. Then it would not be saddled with 
a document that grows unworkable or unpractical. Furthermore, a temporary Basic Law 
could allow for changes to be made before official enactment, and could also leave open 
the possibilities of not enacting an official constitution or scrapping the Basic Law 
completely after a certain period of time. This incremental strategy (similar to how the 
Israeli Basic Law developed, pre-1995) might fit the UK at the moment, considering the 
prospects of further devolution or independence by Scotland, Wales, and Northern Island. 
However the Israeli example provides a sober cautionary example of how unyielding 
“constitutional” desire could also be problematic.  
An even lesser incremental approach, however, would be the most prudent solution for 
the time being. A collection of “organic laws” for various departments, agencies and public 
bodies (e.g., the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, etc.) could be developed, being built upon or 
amended as Parliament sees fit. This would expand Britain’s written but uncodified 
constitution, and would be a sensible incremental step in the direction of a more unified 
constitutional structure.  
 
Conclusion 
“Even when voiced by the greatest humanists, the military overtones are present. 
We have been invited to develop a patriotism based on our modern, liberal, 
constitutions. The constitutional patriot is invited to defend the constitution”.131 
 
It appears that even in this day and age, constitutional distrust remains alive and well. What 
I hope to have accomplished here has been to warn about the dangers of constitutional 
fetishism, and especially the symbolic act of inscribing a “Constitutional” document into 
the UK’s current structure. After all, “capital-C Constitutions are not always the Solon-like 
documents they are sometimes made out to be”.132 However if it turns out what I have 
                                                 
128 P. Rishworth, “New Zealand”, in Oliver and Fusaro (eds), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative 
Study (2013) p. 243. In fact Rishworth notes “there was no talk of public consultation or referendum; nor 
was it politically partisan”. 
129 J. Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346, 1356.  
130 Rishworth, “New Zealand”, in Oliver and Fusaro (eds), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative 
Study (2013) p. 255. 
131 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 185. 
132 King, The British Constitution (2007), p. 8.  
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actually done is cautioned against the dangers of judicial supremacy, including “pass[ing] 
political decisions out of the hands of politicians and into the hands of judges and other 
persons”,133 then I will consider my former objective accomplished.  
Contemporary use of the word “constitution” contains extraordinary power, but also a 
vast, ambiguous emptiness. This much was certainly evident to Weiler134 and Satori.135 
Even though such documents are often flawed,136 marginalise groups in society with less 
power and influence,137 and may become problematic due to fetishism or idolatry, such 
texts continue to be the strongly desired norm. Regardless, the notion that one symbolic 
document can unite citizens into a patriotic whole, and continue to do so within evolving 
democratic problems and pressures, all while remaining flexible and beneficial, is 
eighteenth century naiveté manifested in twenty-first century idealism. If this is what the 
British public desires (i.e., “A New Magna Carta”),138 then go ahead, have your best crack 
at it. 
But if the result of all this righteous discussion produces a document that merely codifies 
what is mostly already written, then I would like to return to where I began, and say: please, 
call it anything but a Constitution.  
                                                 
133 Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 1, 16. 
134 Weiler, “On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 173-190. 
135 Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56(4) American Political Science Review 
853.  
136 Klarman, “A Skeptical View of Constitution Worship”, Constitution Day lecture, Johns Hopkins 
University (16 Sept 2010).  
137 Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Difference (2008). 
138 Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta (10 July 2014), HC 
463.  
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